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I. INTRODUCTION
Free trade and public morality coexist in a precarious balance. On the
one hand, the international trading system was founded on the principle of
nondiscrimination. Countries should not disadvantage those that fail to share
their geopolitical or religious views. On the other hand, the system was also
founded on the notion that countries should not be forced to liberalize trade
when doing so would threaten their public morality. But how is this balance
defined? How does the system grant states sufficient autonomy to regulate on
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moral grounds while preventing states from abusing that power to enact
protectionist measures in disguise?
At the heart of this issue is Article XX(a) of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), more commonly known as the "public morals
exception." This clause allows countries to adopt or enforce trade measures
"necessary to protect public morals."' But what exactly is encompassed within
the scope of this clause? For over fifty years, this question went unanswered,
as no adjudicatory body expounded on its meaning.2 However, in 2005, the
World Trade Organization (WTO) breathed new life into the exception. In a
case generally referred to as U.S.-Gambling, the WTO recognized the right of
the United States to ban internet gambling services on the grounds that such
services violated American public morals.
3
While U.S.-Gambling clarified a few doctrinal issues, the decision left a
number of questions unanswered. For example, who defines what constitutes a
"public moral"? Can the exception only be used for inward-directed measures
designed to protect the morals of one's own citizens? Or can the exception be
outward-directed and serve as a legal cover for trade restrictions against
countries with poor records on human rights, labor norms, or women's rights?
Can the clause be used to curtail trade with those whose actions threaten a
country's territorial integrity? Does it permit trade restrictions based on
religious norms? In the wake of the U.S.-Gambling decision, little has been
written about how the public morals doctrine should evolve.4
This Note discusses these open issues and analyzes potential options for
doctrinal evolution. It is organized in three parts. Part II provides a
background history of the public morals exception clause. I illustrate why,
even though the meaning of the clause was not expounded upon for over fifty
years, the exception remained important, appearing in subsequent trade
agreements and numerous academic works discussing how to incorporate
human rights and labor rights into the WTO. Part III provides an overview of
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX(a), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
2. As a result, relatively few scholarly articles devoted specifically to the public morals
exception clause have been published. Two important contributions are Steve Charnovitz, The Moral
Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 689 (1998) and Christoph T. Feddersen, Focusing on
Substantive Law in International Economic Relations: The Public Morals of GATT's Article XX(a) and
"Conventional" Rules of Interpretation, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 75 (1998). However, the clause has
been raised in a number of other trade-related articles devoted to other areas, particularly human rights
and labor. See, e g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Human Rights Sanctions and International Trade: A Theory of
Compatibility, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 133 (2002); Michael J. Trebilcock & Robert Howse, Trade Policy &
Labor Standards, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 261 (2005).
3. Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter U.S.-Gambling AB
Report].
4. See, e.g., Jeremy C. Marwell, Note, Trade and Morality: The WTO Public Morals
Exception After Gambling, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 802 (2006). Marwell does touch on the open doctrinal
question of standards for considering the question, "which morals are 'public morals'?" but does not
examine many of the other questions considered in Section III.B, infra. Other articles have simply
analyzed errors in the Appellate Body's jurisprudence in the case itself, but these authors have not
examined the questions that U.S.-Gambling leaves unaddressed. See, e.g., Irem Dogan, Note, Taking a
Gamble on Public Morals: Invoking the Article XIV Exception to GATS, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1131
(2007); Kelly Ann Tran, The WTO Appellate Body Gambles on the Future of the GA TS: Analyzing the
Internet Gambling Dispute Between Antigua and the United States Before the World Trade
Organization, 6 APPALACHIAN J.L. 165 (2006).
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the recent U.S.-Gambling decision that finally breathed life into the doctrine. I
suggest that the decision, while historic, rendered an incomplete interpretation
of the clause. I discuss three important unanswered doctrinal questions. For
each, I highlight why the nascent doctrine remains ambiguous and discuss the
range of options available for resolving these uncertainties.
Part IV discusses these unanswered questions in the context of the
debate over how the public morals doctrine should evolve. I examine three
alternatives--one that would retreat to a more originalist interpretation and
two that advocate a broader interpretation, incorporating moral issues such as
human rights and labor standards. I then sound a cautionary note about each of
these alternatives, as each could potentially lead to an outcome that threatens
the overall stability of the global trading regime. In turn, I present a more
modest proposal-one that would impose additional qualifications on the
permitted class of inward-directed measures and, should the WTO choose to
broaden the doctrinal scope to encompass outward-directed measures, would
impose additional evidentiary requirements and allow enforcement only
against those violating affirmative commitments. In doing so, I hope to
present a vision of how the public morals doctrine can be rescued from its
current ambiguity without threatening the fundamental underpinnings of the
global trade regime.
II. A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC MORALS EXCEPTION CLAUSE
When the founders of the modern global trade regime devised the
system following World War II, they carved out a series of ten general
exceptions to the principle of free trade. The first of these exceptions was for
the protection of public morals. Part II provides a basic introduction to this
exception for readers unfamiliar with its history. After explaining the
language of the text itself, I briefly discuss its purpose and drafting history. I
then illustrate how the public morals exception clause lay dormant from 1948
through 2004. During that period, the meaning of the clause was clarified
neither through subsequent negotiations nor through adjudicatory decisions.
Despite this doctrinal dormancy, the public morals clause continued to play an
active role in international trade law. I provide a few illustrations of how
countries continued to use the exception. Finally, I explain how, during this
period, many academics pressed for a broader interpretation of the exception
in order to encompass human rights, labor rights, and other transnational
norms.
A. Considerations on the Clause's Text, History, and Purpose
The exact language of Article XX(a) of the General Agreement of
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), more commonly known as the public morals
exception clause, when read in conjunction with Article XX's chapeau, states:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in
2008]
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this Agreement [i.e., the GATT] shall be construed to prevent the adoption or
enforcement by any contracting party of measures necessary to protect public morals.
5
The idea of allowing countries to restrict trade on moral grounds was first
proposed in November 1945 by the United States.6 This proposal was made
during the early stages of the legal drafting of the GATT founding
agreements. Every subsequent draft contained similar language allowing for
exceptions for "measures necessary to protect public morals." This suggests
that while the drafters continually recognized the importance of enacting such
an exception, they either did not see the need to further elaborate upon the
concept of "public morals" or they could not agree on its meaning. 8 Thus, the
final agreement simply retained the earlier drafts' language that nations can
"adopt[] or enforce[] . . .measures necessary to protect public morals,"
without any further explanatory text.
9
What types of trade-restrictive measures, then, could a nation enact to
protect public morals? Like statutes, international treaties are often interpreted
not solely on the basis of text, but also in conjunction with their purpose and
legislative history. Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties authorizes consultation of a treaty's drafting history as a
supplementary means for determining the meaning of an ambiguous term
within that treaty. 10 However, in this case, the purpose and drafting history
shed little light on the exact meaning of the text.
In his defining work on the history of Article XX(a), Steve Charnovitz
suggested that the American proposal to include a public morals exception
clause was partially designed to protect a series of trade restrictions that the
United States and other countries already had in place at the time the GATT
was negotiated. The restricted items included "intoxicating liquors, smoking
opium and narcotic drugs, lottery tickets, obscene and immoral articles,
counterfeits, pictorial representations of prize fights, and the plumage of
certain birds."'1 The U.S. negotiating party feared that if the new treaty forced
Congress to amend too many laws, Congress might vote against it. The public
morals exception therefore provided legal cover for maintaining existing
domestic laws under the new international trade regime. Beyond this near-
5. GATT, supra note 1, art. XX(a).
6. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUBL'N No. 2411, PROPOSALS FOR THE EXPANSION OF WORLD
TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT (1945).
7. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Apr. 10, 1947, Report of the
Second Session of the Preparatory Committee, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/186 (Sept. 10, 1947); United Nations
Conference on Trade and Employment, Jan. 20-Feb. 25, 1947, Report of the Drafting Committee of the
Preparatory Committee, art. 37(a), U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/34/Rev. I (Mar. 5, 1947) [hereinafter Report of the
Drafting Committee]; United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Oct. 15-Nov. 26, 1946,
Report of the First Session of the Preparatory Committee, art. 32(a), U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/33.
8. Chamovitz, supra note 2, at 704-05 & n.94 (suggesting that the negotiators knew what the
term meant, namely "that it was an amorphous term covering a wide range of activities").
9. United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Nov. 21, 1947-Mar. 24, 1948,
Final Act and Related Documents, U.N. Doc. E/Conf./2/78 (Apr. 1948).
10. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 1 L.M. 679.
11. Chamovitz, supra note 2, at 706 (quoting Letter from Frank B. Kellog, Sec'y of State, to
Wilson, Minister in Switzerland (Oct. 6, 1927) in I PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES 1927, at 254, 257 (1942)).
Free Trade and the Protection of Public Morals
term strategic objective shaped by domestic political concerns, any additional
purpose remains unclear.
Charnovitz also found that the drafting history shed little light on the
meaning of the clause. 12 The records showed that the public morals exceptions
clause was little discussed during the drafting of the actual text. Minutes from
a preparatory meeting held in London in early 1946 simply state that the
negotiators recognized the need for general exceptions "to protect public
health, morals, etc." 13 There was no discussion as to what the term "public
morals" would encompass. Nor were the minutes from the 1947 drafting
session in New York much better. The clause was only discussed during a
Norwegian delegate's comments about Norway's restrictions on the
importation, production, and sale of foreign alcohol. The delegate noted that
the public morals exception clause encompassed such restrictions because the
restrictions' purpose was morality-oriented in nature (i.e., the promotion of
temperance). Aside from alcohol, however, the drafting history provides no
further guidance as to what types of trade restrictions fall within or outside of
the clause's parameters. Throughout the three-year drafting process, the initial
American proposal remained unchanged, with no proposals for further
amendments or clarifications made by any drafter. The clause, therefore,
remained as ambiguous at the end of the drafting process as it had been at its
start.
B. The Clause Lies Dormant: 1948-2004
Vague treaty provisions, like vague statutory provisions, can be
subsequently clarified through one of two mechanisms. Either the drafting
institution can revisit the text, and subsequently add amendments or issue
clarifying regulations, or judicial bodies can interpret and expound upon the
meaning of the text in their rulings. Neither explicatory mechanism was
employed with respect to the public morals clause for over sixty years.
Nevertheless, during this period of "dormancy," the public morals exception
did not fade into oblivion. Despite the fact that its scope and meaning
remained unarticulated, both policymakers and activists continued to look to
the exception to justify the legality of certain acts.
1. Lack of Textual Clarification
Treaty negotiators can themselves elaborate on the meaning of vague
treaty texts through subsequent amendments or through new treaties that
expand or build on the original treaty. The parallel analogue in a domestic
context is when legislators clarify ambiguous statutes through amendments,
subsequent implementing statutes, or other related legislation. When the
public morals exception clause was originally enacted in 1947, most
negotiators expected that the treaty in which it was contained would be shortly
12. Id. at 704-05.
13. United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Draft Report of the Technical Sub-
Committee, 32, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/C.IU54 (Nov. 16, 1946).
14. See Report of the Drafting Committee, supra note 7, at 3 1.
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clarified by a charter establishing an International Trade Organization that
would be part of the United Nations.' 5 That process, however, took much
longer than expected. Indeed, it took trade negotiators forty-seven years and
seven additional rounds of negotiations before the WTO was finally
established in 1994.16
During the first six rounds of the global trade negotiations-which
lasted from 1949 to 1979-negotiators did not elaborate on the public morals
exceptions clause. 17 It was not until the Uruguay Round began in 1986 that
trade negotiators revisited the public morals clause. In drafting a new trade
agreement covering services, known as the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS), the negotiators decided to include a public morals exception
clause. However, rather than elaborating upon or refining the text of GATT
Article XX(a), the public morals exception clause in the GATS-Article
XIV(a)-is eerily similar:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in services, nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member of
measures ... necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order.•I
The public morals exception, as agreed upon in the GATS negotiations,
offered only two relatively minor clarifications to the original 1947 language.
First, the negotiators decided to explicitly invoke the concept of "public
order" within the text. This act definitively resolved any ambiguity around
whether measures to protect public security could fall under the public morals
exception. Second, the negotiators added an explanatory footnote to clarify
that the "exception may be invoked only where a genuine and sufficiently
serious threat is posed to one of the fundamental interests of society."' 9 This
language constrains the scope of the clause to only those situations involving
"serious threats."
Aside from these two clarifications, however, negotiators have chosen
not to further articulate the meaning of the clause through textual
modifications. In the current Doha Round talks, ongoing since 2001,
discussion of the public morals clause is not on the negotiating agenda.
15. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 36-41 (1997).
16. Rounds of international trade negotiations are named after either the city or country in
which they began or an official who played a critical role in starting them. The seven rounds that
occurred between the original founding of the GATT in 1947 and the creation of the WTO in 1994 were
the Geneva Round (1947), the Annecy Round (1949), the Torquay Round (1951), the Dillon Round
(1960-61), the Kennedy Round (1964-67), the Tokyo Round (1973-79), and the Uruguay Round (1986-
94). Following the Uruguay Round, the WTO has held the failed Millennium Round (2000) and the
current Doha Round (2001-present).
17. During these rounds, negotiators revisited and elaborated on several other sections of the
1947 GATT treaty. For example, the scope of the GATT was greatly clarified in anti-dumping measures
and non-tariff barriers.
18. General Agreement on Trade in Services art. XIV, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex I B, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay
Round, 33 I.L.M. 1177 [hereinafter GATS].
19. Id. art. XIV n.5.
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Therefore, the textual ambiguities that existed when the clause was originally
drafted in 1947 continue to exist nearly six decades later.
Yet the fact that the clause has not been expounded upon textually does
not mean that it has been ignored. In fact, the opposite has been true. Today,
incorporating a public morals exception clause into an international trade
agreement has become nearly a standard practice. Almost one hundred trade
treaties now include such a clause. 20 The earliest regional treaty to do so was
the Stockholm Convention establishing the European Free Trade Association
in 1960, which included a public morals exception clause identical to the one
in the GATT.21 Other examples of regional trade agreements that have also
chosen to adopt a public morals clause include the North America Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) 22 and the treaties establishing free trade zones in the
Association of South East Asian Nations,23 the Southern African Development
Community,24 and the Caribbean Community.
25
The public morals exception clause has also become a standard part of
bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs). The United States regularly includes
such a clause in its bilateral FTAs. 2 6 The same is true of the European
Community.27 Nor is this phenomenon limited to bilateral trade agreements
with Western countries. Public morals clauses can be found in a number of
other bilateral treaties, including the Chile-Mexico FTA, the India-Sri Lanka
FTA,29 the China-ASEAN Framework Agreement, 30 and the Japan-Singapore
regional trade agreement. 31 However, no party to any of these treaties has
elaborated on the meaning of the clause. In fact, negotiators to these treaties
20. The full text of these treaties can be found at Regional Trade Agreements,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/region-e/region-e.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2007). See also
Marwell, supra note 4, at 811 & n.37.
21. Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Association art. 12, Jan. 4, 1960, 370
U.N.T.S. 5 [hereinafter Stockholm Convention].
22. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex. art. 2101(1), Dec. 17, 1992, 107
Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 605.
23. Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for the ASEAN Free
Trade Area art. 9, Jan. 28, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 513.
24. Protocol on Trade in the Southern African Development Community art. 9, Aug. 24, 1996,
reprinted in World Trade Org. Comm. on Regional Trade Agreements, WT/REG176/1 (Oct. 8, 2004).
25. Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community Including the
CARICOM Single Market and Economy art. 226, Feb. 19, 1997, available at http://www.caricom.org/
jsp/community/revisedjtreaty-text.pdf.
26. See, e.g., Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, art. 12.1,
Oct. 24, 2000, 115 Stat. 243, 41 I.L.M. 63 [hereinafter U.S.-Jordan FTA]; United States-Chile Free
Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, art. 23.1, June 6, 2003, 117 Stat. 909, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/Chile-FTA/FinaI-Texts/Section Index.html.
27. See, e.g., Euro-Mediterranean Agreement, Egypt-Eur. Community, art. 26, June 25, 2001,
reprinted in World Trade Org. Comm. on Regional Trade Agreements, WT/REF177/1 (Oct. 20, 2004).
28. Free Trade Agreement, Chile-Mex., art. 19-02, Apr. 17, 1998, reprinted in World Trade
Org. Comm. on Regional Trade Agreements, WT/REG 125/I (Aug. 27, 2001).
29. Free Trade Agreement, India-Sri Lanka, art. IV, Dec. 28, 1998, reprinted in World Trade
Org. Comm. on Trade and Dev., WT/COMTD/N/16 (June 27, 2002).
30. Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation, ASEAN-P.R.C., art.
10, Nov. 4, 2002, available at http//www.aseansec.org/13196.htm.
31. Agreement for a New-Age Economic Partnership, Japan-Sing., art. 19, Jan. 13, 2002,
reprinted in World Trade Org. Comm. on Regional Trade Agreements, WT/REG 140/1 (Dec. 3, 2002).
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have chosen either to draft nearly identical language 32 or to incorporate the
GATT exceptions directly into the treaty.
3 3
2. Lack of Judicial Clarification
Like vague statutory language, vague treaty language can also be
clarified by a judicial body. In this instance, the relevant adjudicatory bodies
are the GATT panel (prior to 1994) and the WTO Panel and Appellate Body
(since 1994). A vast amount of international trade law has been created
through this mechanism. 34 From 1948 to 1994, at least 200 disputes were
addressed by GATT panels, with some scholars estimating the number to be
as high as 500.35 Litigation has increased in the WTO era. In the WTO's first
ten years (1995-2004), nations brought over 300 trade disputes to the WTO.36
Yet, the court did not discuss the scope or meaning of the public morals clause
in any one of these cases.
37
This dormancy, however, did not occur because countries failed to take
actions that might implicate the public morals clause. Countries remained
acutely aware of the importance of the public morals exception during this
time period. In fact, a number of countries enacted trade restrictions that they
argued were in the interest of public morals. For example, the United States,
Canada, South Korea, Honduras, Israel, Nigeria, The Gambia, and several
32. See, e.g., Stockholm Convention, supra note 21, art. 12(a) ("[N]othing ... shall prevent
the adoption or enforcement by any Member State of measures ... necessary to protect public morals..
• .11).
33. See, e.g., U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 26, art. 12(1) ("Article XX of GATT 1994 and its
interpretative notcs are incorporated into and made a part of this Agreement.").
34. For general discussions of the WTO jurisprudence and its evolution since the creation of
the GATT in 1947, see JACKSON, supra note 15; MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (3d ed. 2005); and PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND
POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS (2005). A number of
scholars have published books focusing on the jurisprudence in particular specialized areas. See, e.g.,
DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT (1994) (environmental law); THE WTO AND AGRICULTURE
(Kym Andersen & Tim Josling eds., 2005); THE WTO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND THE
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY (Keith E. Maskus ed., 2004) There is also a rich body of legal scholarship
analyzing procedural doctrines within the GATT/WTO system. See, e.g., PETER GALLAGHER, GUIDE TO
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (2002); DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2d ed. 2004); WTO SECRETARIAT, A HANDBOOK ON THE WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (2004), Robert Howse, The Most Dangerous Branch? WTO Appellate Body
Jurisprudence on the Nature and Limits of Judicial Power, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION I I (Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2003).
35. Compare ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION
OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM (1993) (documenting 207 cases handled to date under the GATT
regime) with JACKSON, supra note 15, at 120 ("[lI]t seems plausible that in some sense the GATT system
has handled over 500 disputes since its inception."). Note that the discrepancy in the figure is due to the
fact that decisions were not necessarily issued or published in all disputes, making it difficult for
scholars to agree on an exact figure.
36. For a chronological list of these disputes, see Chronological List of Disputes,
http://www wto.org/english/tratope/dispu-e/dispu_statuse htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2007).
37. The clause was raised as an issue in only one case, generally known as the Tuna-Dolphin
case. In that case, Australia argued that "Article XX(a) .. . could justify measures regarding inhumane
treatment of animals." However, the Panel did not comment on Australia's argument in its eventual
decision, other than to mention that it had been raised. Panel Report, United States-Restrictions on
Imports of Tuna, 4.4, WT/DS21/R-395/155 (Aug. 16, 1991).
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other countries banned the import of pornography on moral grounds. 38 Several
countries have also enacted bans on narcotics. 39 Annex 1 contains a list of the
morality-related import restrictions asserted by nations in their most recent
WTO Trade Policy Reviews.
One might argue that restrictions on pornography or narcotics may not
have served as grounds for a judicial challenge, since it is relatively clear that
both fall within the scope of public morals. However, several other trade
restrictions enacted were certainly more controversial. For example, in 1991,
the Council of the European Community enacted a ban on the import of all
furs caught in nations that did not ban the use of leghold traps. 40 In 1997, the
U.S. Congress banned products made by indentured child labor .4'1 Charnovitz
has highlighted both restrictions as ones that might not necessarily be legally
covered under the public morals exception, since their main purpose was not
to safeguard citizens within their own countries.42 Israel also chose to ban the
importation of all non-Kosher meat products,43 and Indonesia placed special
restrictions on the importation of all alcohol 44-actions that both countries
took on public morals grounds related to religion. It is not, however, clear in
either instance that these bans are legal, since the original public morals
discussion made no mention of religion.45 Yet in none of these instances did
another nation challenge the act. Therefore, none of the enacting countries
needed to explicitly invoke the exception to justify the legality of its act.
Countries have also failed to clarify the meaning of the exception
outside of the WTO. None of the nations that have signed bilateral FTAs with
a public morals exception have litigated the clause, nor have any engaged in
any diplomatic exchanges regarding its meaning. As a result, until 2004,
although numerous trade agreements contained the public morals exception,
no body of jurisprudence existed on its meaning.
C. Clamoring for a Broader Interpretation
In recent years, the public morals exception has increasingly drawn the
attention of academics and international organizations. Since the late 1980s,
calls for the global trade regime to take a more proactive stance in enforcing
38. 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (2000) (prohibiting the importation of "obscene pictures" into the
United States); WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy Review Canada, at 46, WT/TPR/S/53 (Nov. 19, 1998);
WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy Review: The Gambia, at 37, WT/TPR/S/127 (Jan. 5, 2004); WTO
Secretariat, Trade Policy Review. Honduras, at 47, WT/TPR/S/120 (Aug. 29, 2003); WTO Secretariat,
Trade Policy Review: Israel, 44 tbl.ll.8, WT/TPR/S/58 (Aug. 13, 1999); WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy
Review: Korea, at 54, WT/TPR/S/137 (Aug. 18, 2004); Nigeria, Report by the Secretariat: Nigeria
Trade Policy Review, at 49, WT/TPR/S/39 (May 27, 1998).
39. See, e.g., WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy Review: Honduras, supra note 38, at 46
40. Council Decision 97/602, 1997 O.J. (L 242) (EC); Commission Regulation 3254/91, art.
3, 1991 O.J. (L 308) (EC). For more background on the import ban, see Gillian Dale, Comment, The
European Union's Steel Leghold Trap Ban- Animal Cruelty Legislation in Conflict with International
Trade, 7 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 441 (1996).
41. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-61, § 634,
111 Stat. 1272, 1316 (1997).
42. Charnovitz, supra note 2, at 736-42.
43. WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy Review. Israel, supra note 38, at 43.
44. WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy Review- Indonesia, at 46, WT/TPR/S/1 84 (May 23, 2007).
45. See supra Section I1.A (highlighting that the original discussion of the morals exception
does not explicitly mention religion).
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certain transnational norms have grown louder. GATT Article XX lent
support for countries to restrict trade in favor of certain norms such as
environmental protection, 46 cultural protection, 47 and prison labor norms.
48
However, for other norms, such as human rights, gender equality, or labor
standards outside of prisons, no explicit exception exists in the text. Therefore,
several academics began calling for a broader reading of "public morals" that
would permit trade restrictions fostering such norms.
As noted earlier, however, the original scope of the public morals clause
made no reference to human rights or labor rights. In order for the exception
to encompass such norms, several scholars suggested that the WTO ought to
interpret the concept of public morals dynamically. Michael Trebilcock and
Robert Howse argued that "with the evolution of human rights as a core
element in public morality in many postwar societies and at the international
level, the content of [the public morals exception] should extend to universal
human rights, including labor rights."' 49 Sarah Cleveland suggested that the
public morals clause "most plausibly allows for human rights sanctions.
50
Similarly, Stephen Powell asserted that Article XX(a) "likely . . . would
support state action on a number of other human rights concerns, which might
prompt a WTO Member to ban trade to protest immoral acts by a foreign
government against its citizens." 5' Salman Bal and others also urged that the
WTO "consider certain human rights as 'moral standards.'
52
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
recently also endorsed interpreting the public morals clause to encompass
human rights. UNHCR noted that "the very idea of public morality has
become inseparable from the concern for human personhood, dignity, and
capacity reflected in fundamental rights." 53 As a result, "[a] conception of
public morals or morality that excluded notions of fundamental rights would
simply be contrary to the ordinary contemporary meaning."' 54 Therefore,
UNHCR suggested that there were "strong arguments" for the WTO's dispute
settlement body to "accept that internationally recognized human rights norms
and standards should come within the scope" of the public morals clause.
55
46. GATT, supra note 1, art. XX(g).
47. Id. art. XX(f).
48. Id. art. XX(e).
49. Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 2, at 290.
50. Cleveland, supra note 2, at 157.
51. Stephen J. Powell, The Place of Human Rights Law in World Trade Organization Rules,
16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 219, 223 (2004) (citing examples "such as products made by indentured children or
from countries which deny freedom of the press, the right to emigrate, or with a consistent pattern of
gross violations of human rights").
52. Salman Bal, International Free Trade Agreements and Human Rights: Reinterpreting
Article XX of the GA TT, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 62, 78 (2001); see also Gabrielle Marceau, WTO
Dispute Settlement and Human Rights, 13 EUR. J INT'L LAW 753, 789 (2002) (suggesting that a WTO
member imposing import restrictions for human rights considerations may want to justify its actions by
invoking Article XX(a)).
53. Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Human Rights and World Trade
Agreements: Using General Exception Clauses to Protect Human Rights, at 5, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/05/5
(Nov. 2005).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 12.
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Since the WTO's resistance to adding a "Social Clause" to address labor issues became apparent in
the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Declaration,56 academics have also turned to the public morals exception as
a vehicle for allowing WTO members to impose sanctions against other members who violate core labor
rights. Howse has suggested that a trade sanction for labor rights violations can come within the ambit of
the public morals exception if "the sanctions have a basis in the Declaration on Fundamental Labor Rights
or other international human rights instruments of a universal character," "the practices being sanctioned
represent unambiguous violations of the universal content of the right," and the country whose practice is
being sanctioned has been singled out for noncompliance by the International Labour Organization.57
Others have similarly suggested that the public morals exception may legitimize sanctions to combat child
58labor practices.
While human rights and labor rights have received the most attention, some academics have
entertained the possibility of the public morals clause encompassing other rights as well. For example,
Jarvis has suggested that the public morals clause permits trade restrictions to secure women's rights. She
has argued that the exception should be read broadly to cover "trade measures aimed at protecting female
workers in foreign countries," as well as trade measures "to object to domestic violence, female genital
mutilation, bride-burning, forced abortions or sterilization, forced marriages, female infanticide,
prostitution, and trafficking in women. " 59 More recently, some scholars have also argued that Article
XX(a) permits measures designed to restrict trade in conflict diamonds60 and import bans designed to raise
61the welfare of animals used in meat production.
Through the first five decades of Article XX(a)'s existence, the trade and morality doctrine remained
largely an academic discussion. Although the clause had been invoked by governments and academics and
replicated in numerous agreements, the doctrine itself remained largely untouched and undefined by the
international trade regime that created it. Whether the exception should be interpreted as broadly as
suggested by many scholars remained an open question.
56 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 13 December 1996, WT/M1N(96)/DEC, 36 LM.
(stating that "[t]he International Labour Organization (ILO) is the competent body to set and deal
with" core labor standards).
57 Robert Howse, The World Trad ctonofWorker' k Zm
58 See, e.g., Anjli Garg, Note, Labor Social Clause: A y a] for Action. 31 NXYU k
Int'! L. & Pol. 473, 526 (1999).
59 Liane M. Jarvis, Note, F -'GATT 2
Int'6 L. 219 236-37 (2000).
60 Karen E. Woody,DiodsothSosoferSosThKibrvPoesadteMaiyExpio
61 Edward M. Thomas, Note,
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III. U.S. -GAMBLING AND THE CREATION OF A PUBLIC MORALS CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE
The WTO finally broke its silence about the public morals clause in
2005 in the U.S.-Gambling case. In this Part, I provide an overview of the
facts of this dispute and the decisions issued by the WTO's Panel and
Appellate Body. I then discuss the emerging public morals clause
jurisprudence, as established by the U.S.-Gambling decision. I argue that
while the decision invokes the public morals clause and attempts to harmonize
it with certain core principles of international trade law, what is more
significant about the decision is that it left a number of difficult doctrinal
questions unaddressed.
A. An Overview of the U.S.-Gambling Dispute
The U.S.-Gambling case resulted from the U.S. decision to ban
crossborder gambling and betting services. On March 27, 2003, Antigua and
Barbuda, a small island state in the Caribbean with slightly more than sixty-
five thousand inhabitants, brought a complaint before the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body alleging that the U.S. ban was illegal. As a result of an
economic diversification program in the mid-1990s, Antigua had emerged as a
major player in the internet-based offshore gaming industry. By 1999, Antigua
had 119 licensed operators employing more than three thousand people,
accounting for approximately ten percent of the nation's GDP.62 However, by
2003, this once-promising growth sector had fallen into decline. Antigua
asserted that the U.S. laws-namely, the federal Wire Act,63 the Travel Act,64
and the Illegal Gambling Business Act65-were illegal under the GATS and a
"material factor" in triggering this decline.66
At the time the case was filed, no one expected that the dispute would
lead to any discussion of the public morals exception clause. In fact, in its
First Written Submission, the United States never once made mention of the
need to protect public morals.67 Only after the first oral argument did the
62. First Submission of Antigua and Barbuda, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 30, WT/DS285 (Oct. 1, 2003), available at
http://www.antigua-barbuda.com/business-politics/pdf/AntiguaFirst-Submission.pdf.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
66. First Submission of Antigua and Barbuda, supra note 62, 37. By 2003, the number of
licensed offshore gambling and betting services operators in Antigua had declined to twenty-eight,
employing fewer than five hundred people. Id.; see also Panel Report, United States-Measures
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 3.5, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10,
2004) [hereinafter U.S.-Gambling Panel Report]. Note that Antigua also claimed that a number of U.S.
state laws violated the U.S. GATS commitments. However, the Panel absolved Colorado, Minnesota,
New Jersey, and New York because those states' laws did not impose criminal liability on suppliers of
cross-border gambling services, and the Appellate Body later ruled that Antigua failed to make a prima
facie case that the laws of Louisiana, Massachusetts, South Dakota, and Utah violated GATS Article
XVI:2. Raj Bhala & David A. Gantz, WTO Case Review 2005, 23 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 107, 312-
15 (2005).
67. First Written Submission of the United States, United States-Measures Affecting the
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285 (Nov. 7, 2003), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Monitoring-Enforcement/DisputeSettlementlWTO/Disp
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United States raise this defense. 68 The United States asserted that the ban on
remote gambling was necessary because the service posed an increased threat
for: (1) organized crime, (2) money laundering, (3) fraud and other consumer
crimes, (4) public health (i.e., pathological gambling), and (5) children and
youth (i.e., underage gambling).69 Taken together, these posed "a grave threat
to the maintenance of the public order and the protection of public morals."
70
Antigua countered that these public moral concerns were contrived and
ill-founded. It argued that the United States had not submitted "evidence of
organized crime involvement in Antigua's gambling industry nor [had] it
submitted any evidence that Antigua would not cooperate with criminal
investigations and prosecutions by the United States." ' Moreover, Antigua
explained that its regulatory scheme sufficiently addressed U.S. concerns7
and that the United States had rejected its overtures to engage in consultations
over its scheme. 73 Furthermore, Antigua noted that age verification and other
technologies existed to prevent underage gambling that "would be less
restrictive on international trade than a total prohibition." 7 4 As a result,
Antigua argued that the United States failed to prove that its measures
constituted a "necessary" exception to its GATS commitments. Furthermore,
Antigua asserted that the U.S. measures violated the requirements of GATS
Article XIV's chapeau that any measure to protect public morals be
nondiscriminatory. Because Antiguan operators were denied access to
distribution methods available to American service providers, the U.S. laws
resulted in "obvious 'unjustifiable discrimination."' 75
On November 10, 2004, the Panel in U.S.-Gambling issued the WTO's
first-ever pronouncements on the public morals clause. It began by first
defining public morals as "standards of right and wrong conduct maintained
by or on behalf of a community or nation. ', 76 The Panel then concluded that,
theoretically, restrictions on gambling could fall within the scope of the public
uteSettlement Listings/asset_uploadfile732_5581.pdf. In its initial arguments in defense, the United
States argued that it had made no commitments on gambling and was therefore under no obligation to
liberalize trade in this service sector. Id. 59-76. Note that Antigua did prepare for the possibility that
the United States would make an Article XIV(a) defense by briefing a number of concerns related to
such a potential argument in its First Submission. See First Submission of Antigua and Barbuda, supra
note 62, %1 204-12.
68. See Executive Summary of the Second Written Submission of the United States, United
States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 1 37,
WT/DS285 (Jan. 16, 2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/
Monitoring-Enforcement/Dispute-Settlement/WTO/Dispute-Settlement 
-Listings/asset-upload -file665
5581 .pdf. Note that the United States also continued to assert that "the Panel need not resort to Article
XIV [public morals exception clause] to resolve this dispute" because no actual gambling commitments
had been made. See id. 4.
69. Id. % 22-23.
70. Id. 37.
71. U.S.-Gambling Panel Report, supra note 66, $ 3.288
72. First Submission of Antigua and Barbuda, supra note 62, 1 42-74.
73. Sir Ronald Sanders, Chief Foreign Affairs Representative with Ministerial Rank, Opening
Statement at the First Panel Meeting in the Dispute Between Antigua and Barbuda and the United States
on Internet Gambling $ 4 (Dec. 10, 2003), available at http://www.antigua-barbuda.com/
business-politics/does/FirstPanelMeeting.doc.
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morals exception." However, in this particular case, the Panel sided with
Antigua in decreeing that the United States had "not been able to provisionally
justify" that its statutes "are necessary to protect public morals and/or public
order within the meaning" of the public morals exception. 78 The Panel
emphasized that the United States had an obligation to explore possible
alternatives with Antigua before imposing its ban. Because the United States
rejected Antigua's invitation to do so, its statutes could not pass the Panel's
"necessity" test.79 In addition, the Panel held that the United States did not
offer convincing proof that it treated domestic and foreign suppliers of
gambling services in a consistent manner. As a result, it could not verify that
the statutes were nondiscriminatory, as required by the GATS Article XIV
chapeau.8'
On appeal, the Appellate Body overturned the Panel's finding that the
U.S. trade restriction was not "necessary. '"82 The Appellate Body ruled that the
Panel erred in its application of the necessity test. Procedurally, Antigua was
required to identify a less restrictive alternative, and the United States's
refusal to engage in consultations, on which the Panel's decision turned, did
not necessarily suggest the existence of an alternative. 83 Thus, the Panel did
not have sufficient grounds to declare that the U.S. statutes failed the necessity
test. The Appellate Body also overturned the Panel's ruling that the United
States's enforcement of its statutes was de facto discriminatory and violated
the public moral clause's chapeau. It held that the evidentiary record was
insufficient for the Panel to reach this conclusion. 84 Nevertheless, the
Appellate Body upheld the Panel's ruling that the United States had failed to
demonstrate that its restrictions did not discriminate against foreign gambling
service providers. 85 Provided this could be rectified, however, the U.S.
restrictions would be allowed to stand.
Both sides rushed to declare victory. Antigua claimed a "David versus
Goliath" victory, which was technically true, as the Appellate Body had sided
with Antigua. The United States also claimed victory. The Appellate Body
had recognized its right to enact a ban on gambling services on moral grounds,
77. Id. 6.474. To reach this decision, the Panel considered a number of factors including
historical facts (e.g., a 1927 debate in the Economic Committee of the League of Nations), other
countries' regulations, and decisions in the European Court of Justice. See id. 7 6.472-73.
78. Id. 7 6.535.
79. Id. $T 6.531-35. To reach this decision, the Panel needed to first reject the argument that
the U.S. had not made any commitments on gambling in its schedule. See id. 6.134 for further details
on why the Panel chose to do so. See also id. %9 6.137-38.
80. Id. 97 6.607-08.
81. Id. T 6.608
82. U S.-Gambling AB Report, supra note 3, 97 324-26.
83. Id. $T 311, 317-18. "Engaging in consultations with Antigua ... was not an appropriate
alternative for the Panel to consider because consultations are by definition a process, the results of
which are uncertain and therefore not capable of comparison with the measures at issue in this case." Id.
T317.
84. Id. 77 353-57. The Appellate Body noted that instead the Panel should have focused on de
jure discrimination and that the "measures, on their face, do not discriminate between United States and
foreign suppliers of remote gambling services." Id. T 357.
85. Id. 97 367-72. In particular, the Appellate Body held that the Interstate Horse Racing Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 3001-07 (2000 & Supp. V 2000), could potentially be discriminatory if it exempted
American but not foreign suppliers of remote gambling services, such as off-track betting.
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and provided it could enact this ban in a nondiscriminatory manner, its ban
could stand.86
B. Doctrinal Clarifications from the U.S.-Gambling Decision
For many outside observers, the most important development of the case
was not its outcome, but the fact that a WTO adjudicatory body had finally
expounded on the meaning of the public morals clause. The Appellate Body
itself was conscious of the historic nature of its decision, observing that the
case was the first "where the Appellate Body was requested to address
exceptions relating to 'public morals."'
87
I suggest that the U.S.-Gambling decision, while historic, was extremely
cautious in its jurisprudence. It clarified little beyond what was required, and
instead deferred most of the difficult doctrinal questions for future
consideration. In each instance of clarification, the adjudicators simply
confirmed that the interpretative principles that had been applied to other
general exceptions should also be extended to the public morals clause. I
discuss three such clarifications in this Section.
1. Necessity
Like two other Article XX exceptions, the public morals exception can
only be applied if a measure is deemed "necessary."88 In the Korea-Beef 9 and
E. C. -Asbestos90 cases, the Appellate Body laid out a three-factor balancing
test for considering necessity. U.S.-Gambling clarified that the same necessity
test should be used when evaluating a public morals claim. In deciding
whether a measure is necessary to protect public morals, adjudicators are to
weigh and balance: (1) the importance of the societal interests and values that
the measure is intended to protect,9 1 (2) the "extent to which the [challenged
measure] contribute[s] to the realization of the ends pursued" by the
86. Subsequent to the decision, the United States did not make any changes to the text of any
of the challenged statutes or the Interstate Horse Racing Act (IHA). The United States argued that it was
not required to do so by the ruling, since it could comply with the Appellate Body's ruling by
demonstrating that the measures met the requirements of GATS Article XIV, which it did through an
April 2006 statement by the Department of Justice. See First Written Submission of the United States,
United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services-
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Antigua and Barbuda, 43-44, WT/DS285 (Oct 16, 2006),
available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Monitonng-Enforeement/Dispute-
Settlement/WTO/Dispute_.SettlementListings/asset-upload-file356_5581,pdf. However, the Article
21.5 Panel has found the United States to be in noncompliance with the ruling. Panel Report, United
States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services-Recourse to
Article 21.5 of the DSU by Antigua and Barbuda, WT/DS285/RW (Mar. 30, 2007).
87. U.S-Gambling AB Report, supra note 3, 291 n.351 (noting also that this was the first
case in which the Appellate Body was requested to address the GATS general exceptions).
88. See GATT, supra note 1, art. XXI(b), (d).
89. Appellate Body Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen
Beef, 178, WT/ DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000).
90. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, 172, WT/DS I35/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001).
91. U.S.-Gambling Panel Report, supra note 66, 6.492.
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measures, 92 and (3) the trade impact of the challenged measure, including
"whether a reasonably available WTO-consistent alternative measure"
exists.
93
The Appellate Body made important procedural clarifications about the
third prong of this test. As noted earlier, the Appellate Body clarified that a
state need not engage in any consultations with other WTO members before
enacting a restriction to protect public morals.94 In other words, it rejected the
Panel's suggestion to add a "consultations pre-condition" to the necessity
doctrine. Furthermore, the Appellate Body clarified that the burden falls on
the challenging party "to identify a reasonably available alternative
measure" 95 if it argues that the restriction is not necessary.96 A defendant is
only expected to respond once the challenging party has first proven the
existence of a reasonable alternative.
2. Nondiscrimination
In addition, any GATT Article XX (or GATS Article XIV) exception
must also meet the requirement of the article's chapeau that a measure not be
applied in a manner that constitutes "arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination."9 7 There exists a long line of previous WTO cases discussing
how nondiscrimination is to be evaluated. 98 These previous cases have
clarified that the chapeau restricts not only overtly discriminatory measures
but also facially nondiscriminatory measures whose application creates a
discriminatory effect.
99
The Appellate Body in U.S.-Gambling clarified that the public morals
exception should be interpreted in conformity with the established principle
for evaluating nondiscrimination. In holding that the challenged measures
failed to meet the chapeau's requirement, the Appellate Body based its finding
not on actual discrimination but rather on the United States's failure to
demonstrate that the measures were applied in a nondiscriminatory manner.
100
Again, the Appellate Body did not require outright discrimination but deemed
the possibility of a discriminatory application to be sufficient.
3. Dynamic Interpretation
Because both necessity and nondiscrimination are requirements
explicitly stated in the text, it is unsurprising that the first public morals clause
92. Id. 6.494.
93. Id. 7 6.495-96.
94. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
95. U.S.-Gambling AB Report, supra note 3, 326.
96. Seeid. 310-11.
97. GATT, supra note 1, art. XX; GATS, supra note 18, art. XIV.
98. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, European Communities--conditions for the Granting of
Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 5, 2001); Appellate Body Report,
United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, VT/DS8/AB/R,
WT/DS I 0/AB/R, WT/DS 1 1/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle AB Report]; Appellate
Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/ DS58/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996).
99. See Shrimp/Turtle AB Report, supra note 98, 165, 168, 172, 175.
100. U.S.-Gambling AB Report, supra note 3, 369, 371.
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case would be forced to elucidate these doctrinal principles. The third
doctrinal clarification, however, differs because it concerned an issue which
the adjudicators could have avoided but did not. Prior to U.S.-Gambling, it
was unclear whether the public morals clause should be interpreted statically
or dynamically. Static interpreters would limit the exception to the scope of
public morals as understood by the drafters in 1947. Dynamic interpreters, in
contrast, would argue that the scope can expand over time as new issues of
public morality emerge.
In Shrimp/Turtle, the Appellate Body hinted at its preference for
dynamic interpretation, at least with respect to the GATT Article XX(g)
exception for conservation of natural resources. It proclaimed that the clause
"must be read by a treaty interpreter in light of the contemporary concerns of
the community of nations."10' U.S.-Gambling appeared to endorse a similarly
dynamic interpretation of public morals. The Panel stated unequivocally that
"the content of [public morals] can vary in time and space, depending upon a
range of factors, including prevailing social, cultural, ethical and religious
values."'10 2 This language stood unmodified by the Appellate Body.
Adoption of such language was not necessary since, as the Panel itself
recognized, gambling clearly fell within the original scope of the public
morals clause. 103 The case therefore could have been resolved without
recourse to dynamic interpretation. Nevertheless, the Panel chose explicitly to
establish the dynamic nature of the exception. This move represented yet
another doctrinal clarification in line with previous Appellate Body
jurisprudence.
C. Unanswered Questions
Outside of confirming that three previously established principles
applied to the public morals clause, U.S.-Gambling did little to clarify other
difficult doctrinal questions concerning the exception. In this Section, I
highlight three such questions. Failure to provide answers has meant that what
constitutes a legal invocation of the public morals exception still remains
largely uncertain in the wake of U.S.-Gambling.
1. Defining Public Morals: Universalism vs. Unilateralism
The first doctrinal question that U.S.-Gambling did not address is a basic
definitional question: which morals are "public morals" as opposed to those
that are simply shared by a group of individuals? One possibility is that
"public morals" include only those moral principles that are universal or
widely shared by all humankind. At the other extreme is the possibility that
each state is a proxy for the "public," and therefore, each state can unilaterally
define its own public morals. Other variants would lie in between, such as a
requirement that a certain number of states, but not necessarily all, have
101. Shrimp/Turtle AB Report, supra note 98, 129.
102. U.S.-Gambling Panel Report, supra note 66, 6.461 (emphasis added).
103. Id. 6.472 (concluding that the drafters likely considered the term "public morals" to
encompass gambling because of a 1927 League of Nations debate linking gambling and morality).
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adopted a particular moral principle before it could become a "public
moral.'
0 4
Both universalism and unilateralism would pose potential problems. If
one were to require that morals be near-universal before being considered a
"public moral," then the set of morals that would actually qualify might be so
limited as to render the exceptions clause effectively useless. Only a handful
of moral principles are widely shared in the international community-such as
prohibitions against genocide, 105 slavery, 106 and execution of the mentally
retarded. 107 Moreover, from a practical standpoint, when a norm is already
widely shared, states will rarely have a need to protect against it-likewise
rendering the exception clause useless. In addition, imposing a narrow
universalist standard would invalidate many of the morality-based trade
restrictions that nations currently exercise. For example, some Muslim nations
have imposed an import ban on alcohol by referencing public morality.0 8 Yet
abstention from alcohol consumption is hardly a moral that is universally
shared, even if it is widespread among Islamic societies.
On the other hand, allowing states to unilaterally define their "public
morals" would also entail certain problems. The main threat is that, left
unconstrained, states will abuse the exception to pass a large number of trade
• • 109 .er
restrictions under the guise of protecting public morals. Even if a state were
required to present evidentiary proof that an issue is of genuine concern to
public morality, there is the risk that such evidence could not be easily
verified and the test "would collapse in practice into an empty procedural
requirement."1 
0
Given this difficult choice, it is unsurprising that U.S.-Gambling did not
provide clear guidance on this issue. The Panel appeared to reject a pure
universalist approach. It clarified that WTO members "should be given some
scope to define and apply for themselves the concept of 'public morals.""
111
On the other hand, the decision also implied that public morals cannot be
unilaterally defined. In determining whether restrictions on gambling
104. See Marwell, supra note 4, at 819-26 (presenting a similar spectrum of options and
articulating the possibility of a "moral majority or multiplicity" alternative). Note that one option would
be to use a parallel form of the legal standard for determining whether a particular practice has become
part of customary international law
105. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
106. See Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, 60
L.N.T.S. 253, amended by Protocol Amending the Slavery Convention, Dec. 7, 1953, 7 U.S.T. 479, 182
U.N T.S. 51.
107. "[W]ithin the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed
by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved." Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317
n.21 (2002).
108. WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy Review: Indonesia, at 46, WT/TPR/184 (May 23, 2007);
WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy Review: Qatar, at 26-27, WT/TPR/S/144 (Jan. 24, 2005).
109. See Marwell, supra note 4, at 826 ("Allowing a country to invoke the public morals
exception unilaterally could shield from WTO scrutiny regulations that inefficiently restrict trade or are
motivated by protectionism. Without reference to international practice, it might be feared that any
municipal law or regulation could be cast as a matter of public morals, undoing the WTO's significant
progress in liberalizing regulatory barriers to trade.") (citation omitted).
110. Id. at 824 (highlighting some of the nsks with such a requirement, but arguing nonetheless
in favor of it).
11l. U.S.-Gambling Panel Report, supra note 66, 6.461 (emphasis added).
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constituted a protection of public morals, the Panel carefully examined the
practices of other WTO members. The Panel found that two other WTO
members restricted trade in gambling-related services and products on moral
grounds, 112 while sixteen others had already restricted or prohibited internet
gambling or were in the process of doing so." 3 Based on this evidence, the
Panel concluded that the U.S. ban could fall under the public morals clause.,
14
The Panel's inquiry thus suggests that, had the United States been alone in
defining gambling as an issue of public morality, the outcome might have
been different.
Thus, the U.S.-Gambling decision appeared to reject both the pure
unilateralist and the pure universalist approach. However, it also sidestepped
the matter of determining what a middle-ground approach would entail. It left
open for future WTO adjudicators to decide the question: to what extent must
other nations agree that a particular topic is an issue of public morality before
a nation can enact a trade restriction to protect it?
2. Legitimacy Requirements
Second, U.S.-Gambling left unanswered the question of whether a public
moral needs to be endorsed by certain institutions or through certain processes
in order to be considered legitimate. In other words, can a government simply
declare without proof that a restriction serves to protect a public moral? Or
must it offer some evidence that the public seeks to have such a moral
protected? If so, what confers legitimacy? Would it be an opinion poll,
endorsement by an international organization, and/or passage through certain
parliamentary procedures?
In U.S.-Gambling, the Panel defined "public morals" as "prevailing"
values. It gave wide latitude to the types of values encompassed within the
term, by allowing states to base it upon "a range of factors, including
prevailing social, cultural, ethical, and religious values." ' 1 5 However, neither
the Panel nor the Appellate Body specified what a member must do to
establish that a belief is "prevailing." Moreover, looking at the United States's
argument in U.S.-Gambling offers little assistance. In its brief and oral
arguments, the United States made reference only to legislative reports,
statements before Congressional committee hearings, and the Congressional
Record. 116 It did not cite any opinion polls or general publications to
112. The Panel noted that Israel prohibits the importation of lottery tickets while the
Philippines restricts foreign ownership of gambling operations. Id. 6.471
113. At the time of the Panel's decision, Estonia, Hong Kong, Iceland, Norway, and Uruguay
had either prohibited or severely restricted internet gambling. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil,
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom had developed or
were in the process of developing a regulatory framework for internet gambling. Id 6.473 n.914.
114. Id. 6.474.
115. Id. T 6.461.
116. Id. 6.481-87 (noting that the U.S. evidence presented included a 1961 report by the
House of Representatives on the Wire Act, the testimony of Attorney General Robert Kennedy before
the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1961, the 2003 hearings before the Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism and Homeland Security regarding the yet-to-be-enacted Unlawful Internet Gambling Funding
Prohibition Act, and the Congressional statement of findings made in advance of enactment of the
Illegal Gambling Business Act).
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demonstrate that the morals in question were widely held in the United
States.117
We are therefore left with a series of unanswered questions about what
is required to confer legitimacy upon a set of trade restrictions. Is the WTO
implicitly endorsing a theory of democratic legitimacy, that is, assuming that
any legislative action reflects the will and mores of the majority of citizens?
Or could an executive branch simply enact a trade restriction on its own
accord in the name of protecting public morals? Had the measures resulted
from executive orders or administrative decrees, would they also have
legitimately represented prevailing public mores? Would it matter if the
executive was democratically accountable, or if the executive branch held
public consultations before enacting the restrictive measure? U.S.-Gambling
simply demanded that a public moral be "prevailing," but failed to establish
any requirements as to what is necessary to prove this fact.
U.S.-Gambling also left open the question of whether pronouncements
from other international organizations should influence Article XX(a) disputes
and, if so, to what extent. Certain scholars, worried about potential abuse of
discretion if countries were allowed to define public morals unilaterally, have
advocated tying application of the public morals exception to multilateral
determinations. Countries would need to draw on such determinations in
order to buttress their claim that a genuine issue of public morality is at stake.
Again, U.S.-Gambling offered mixed signals on this question. On the
one hand, the Panel appeared to endorse a meaningful role for international
organizations in defining public morality issues. It turned to rulings within the
European Court of Justice upholding the right of countries to enact
crossborder restrictions on gambling services as proof that such bans were
legitimate. 119 As noted earlier, it also turned to proclamations dating back to
the League of Nations. 20 On the other hand, the Panel blatantly disregarded
assessments from a multilateral organization about the seriousness of the
threat to public morality in this particular case. One of the reasons that the
United States argued that the ban was necessary was to guard against money
laundering. Antigua retorted that a multilateral regime known as the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF) had been established to coordinate international
responses to money laundering and that both the United States and Antigua
were members of this multilateral regime. 12 1 Each year, the FATF identifies
117. This absence led Antigua to challenge whether the morals being protected were actually
held by the American public. It noted that Americans spent more on gambling than on groceries, 68% of
Americans had gambled in the past year and 86% in the course of their lifetime, many global remote-
gaming operations were American in origin, and remote-access gambling had spread. See First
Submission of Antigua and Barbuda, supra note 62, } 77, 82-86, 117-18.
118. See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 2, at 162-63 (suggesting "an evolutionary approach tying
GATT interpretations to human rights law"); Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 2, at 281 (expecting that
the "dispute settlement organs of the WTO would rely heavily on the judgment of the ILO and/or UN
human rights organs in determining the seriousness of the situation to which the unilateral sanctions are
a response").
119. U.S.-Gambling Panel Report, supra note 66, 6.473 n.914 (citing Case C-6/01,
Associaq~o Nacional de Operadores de Mfquinas Recreativas (Anomar) and Others v. Portugal, 2003
E.C.R. 1-8621; and Case C-275/92, Her Majesty's Custom and Excise v. Schindler, 1994 E.C.R. 1-1039).
120. See id. 6.472.
121. The FATF includes thirty-four member states and was established by the G7 Summit in
1989 to adopt and implement measures designed to counter the use of the financial system by criminals.
Free Trade and the Protection of Public Morals
noncooperative countries, and at the time of the dispute, nine countries were
so designated-a list that did not include Antigua. In fact, Antigua was a
model member; it had implemented all of the FATF's recommendations to
combat money laundering and chaired the Caribbean regional body (CFATF)
to which the United States also belonged. 122 Antigua argued that it was
unreasonable for the United States to issue an outright ban directed at all
countries to address its money laundering concems when a multilateral regime
already existed that allowed the United States to target likely offenders.
Moreover, the multilateral regime provided an objective determination that the
situation in Antigua was unproblematic, a finding that the United States
subsequently ignored. The Panel, in this instance, discounted Antigua's
argument and downplayed the importance of the multilateral organization's
country assessments.
U.S.-Gambling therefore failed to provide clear signals regarding the
requisite burden of proof for establishing that a trade restriction genuinely
protects public morals. The decision does not answer the question of whether
public morals can be established by the legislature, the executive branch,
multilateral institutions, opinion polls, and/or any other mechanism.
3. Inward- vs. Outward-Directed Measures
Perhaps the most important doctrinal question left unaddressed by U.S.-
Gambling is the third issue: does the public morals exceptions clause cover
only restrictions enacted by a government to protect its own citizens? Or can it
encompass extraterritorial applications? In other words, if a practice of the
exporting state with respect to its citizens offends the public morality of the
importing state, can the importing state restrict trade with the exporting state?
To date, most discussions on this question have largely used the
terminology of "inwardly-directed" vs. "outwardly-directed" (or
"extraterritorial") restrictions. I231 suggest instead a three-part division that
further subdivides the latter category. Type I restrictions are those used to
directly safeguard the morals of inhabitants within one's own country. The
U.S. ban on internet gambling would fall into this category, as would bans on
pornography, narcotics, or alcohol. Type II restrictions are those linked to the
protection of those directly involved in the production of the product or
service in the exporting state. For example, a ban on products made by child
labor would fall within this category, as would a ban on services for sex
tourism. Type III restrictions are those aimed at products or services produced
in an exporting state whose practices are considered morally offensive by the
importing state, but where the practices are not directly involved in the
production of the products or service being banned. An example would be an
outright ban on imports from Sudan because of its government's human rights
violations in Darfur.
For more information, see Financial Action Task Force, http://www.fatf-gafi.org (last visited Nov. 7,
2007).
122. Caroline Bissett, All Bets are Off(line): Antigua's Trouble in Virtual Paradise, 35 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 367, 384-88 (2004).
123. See Charnovitz, supra note 2, at 695.
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Type II and Type III restrictions cannot arise simply because one state
seeks to meddle in the internal affairs of another. Like Type I restrictions, they
also require a showing that its own citizens find a certain practice to be
offensive to public morality. In other words, all three types of restrictions arise
out of the importing state's moral concern. What differs is that Type II and
Type III restrictions may also be seeking to protect certain individuals beyond
the restricting state's own borders, whereas this is not the case for Type I
restrictions.
By recognizing the right of a country to use trade-restrictive measures to
protect its own citizens, U.S.-Gambling explicitly endorsed Type I restrictions
under the public morals clause. However, the legality of Type II and Type III
restrictions-the outward-directed restrictions-was left uncertain. Some have
argued that the public morals exception should extend to Type II restrictions,
since another WTO general exception (i.e., Article XX(e) for products of
prison labor 24) is such a restriction.125 Others have suggested that if the public
morals clause were to extend extraterritorially, it should encompass Type III
restrictions, rather than simply Type II restrictions. 126 However, in US.-
Gambling, neither the Panel nor the Appellate Body willingly addressed either
Type II or Type III restrictions. Without an explicit endorsement by the WTO
that either type of restriction is legal, governments will continue to be
reluctant to employ trade restrictions to spur social change in other countries.
Whether the public morals doctrine allows countries to enact sanctions
aimed at protecting individuals outside of their own borders is a question of
critical importance. A doctrine that encompasses Type II and/or Type III
restrictions is much more powerful than one limited to only Type I
restrictions. Yet again, U.S.-Gambling fails to provide a clear answer.
Part III has demonstrated that the US.-Gambling decision is less of a
significant breakthrough for the public morals clause doctrine than supposed.
The decision left almost all of the critical doctrinal questions-ranging from
"how is the clause to be interpreted" to "who can the clause be used to
protect"-unanswered. In Part IV, I discuss some alternative proposals for
how the three unanswered questions could potentially be resolved.
IV. BEYOND US.-GAMBLING: PROCEEDING WITH CAUTION
In considering how the public morals doctrine should evolve, the WTO
should have two objectives in mind. First, the clause ought to remain aligned
with the evolution of the rest of international trade law. How the exception
clause is construed should not deviate significantly from the interpretative
124. GATT, supra note I, art. XX(e).
125. See, e.g., Bal, supra note 52, at 107; Charnovitz, supra note 2, at 701.
126. See, e.g., Francisco Francioni, Environment, Human Rights, and the Limits of Free Trade,
in ENVIRONMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1, 19-20 (Francesco Francioni ed.,
2001) (attacking a product-oriented approach as incongruent logically and asserting instead that an
extratemtorial application of the exception should be linked to international standards of morality and
human dignity).
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methods used for other legal texts on international trade. This goal is
important in ensuring that the jurisprudence of the WTO remains a consistent
and coherent body of law. Second, the clause should not undermine the global
trading system. The GATTiWTO regime has functioned effectively for six
decades partially because it has avoided becoming entangled in the ideological
battles that have ensnared other multinational institutions. Legal realists would
say that in order for the clause to be effective, it must continue to be viewed
by the major trading powers (on whose support the regime depends) as a tool
to facilitate rather than undermine their trade objectives.
With these objectives in mind, I explore three possible alternatives for
how the public morals doctrine could evolve in the future. I highlight
weaknesses with each approach. Finally, I offer my own proposed solution for
a limited expansion of the doctrinal scope.
A. Potential Alternatives
1. A Retreat to Originalism
One possibility is that judges could decide to constrain, rather than
expand, the scope of the public morals exception. This would be done by
explicitly stating that the exception applies only to inward-directed measures
(i.e., Type I restrictions) of the type witnessed in U.S.-Gambling. It would also
make explicit that the list of exceptions is static-that is, restricted to the
concept of public morals as understood at the time of the treaty's
negotiation. 27As one advocate has argued, this approach would do the most
to ameliorate concerns that the p2ublic morals exception will be invoked for
disguised protectionist purposes. Future WTO panels would rely heavily on
the GATT negotiating history to determine whether the challenged measure
falls within the intended scope of the public morals exception. 129 The outcome
in U.S.-Gambling would be consistent with this approach, since gambling falls
under the scope of morality considered by the original GATT negotiators.
This approach should be rejected for three reasons. First, morals do vary
with time and context, a fact that U.S.-Gambling itself recognized. 30 Second,
the approach contradicts how WTO members have already come to
understand and exercise the clause. For example, religious mores were not
enumerated as one of the original exceptions, yet the public morals exception
has been frequently invoked to enact import bans on goods for religious
reasons (e.g., Israel's ban on non-Kosher meats and Islamic countries' ban on
alcohol). A retreat to originalism would throw the legitimacy of such
exceptions in doubt. Third, originalism would also contravene the approach
127. See supra Section II.A for a discussion of what that interpretation entailed. See also
Charnovitz, supra note 2, at 705-17, for a detailed historical review.
128. Miguel A. Gonzalez, Note, Trade and Morality: Preserving "Public Morals" Without
Sacrificing the Global Economy, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 939, 971 (2006).
129. See, e.g., Tatjana Eres, Note, The Limits of GATT Article XX: A Back Door for Human
Rights?, 35 GEO. J. INT'L L. 597 (2004) (using such an approach to determine that Article XX cannot be
used to justify trade restrictions based on human rights).
130. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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taken by the WTO in interpreting other enumerated exceptions in Article
XX.131 As a result, an originalist approach would certainly frustrate one of the
goals identified above: finding a solution in step with the rest of international
trade law.
2. Expansive Unilateralism with Evidentiary Constraints
Jeremy Marwell has offered another proposal for the post-U.S.-
Gambling evolution of the public morals doctrine. Marwell argues that
countries should be allowed to define morals unilaterally, but with the
condition that the trade-restrictive measure "be the least restrictive means of
protecting the interest at stake and that it be applied in a nondiscriminatory
fashion.",132 In addition, countries must provide evidence to verify that the
measures are based on morals shared by the public. Marwell suggests this
latter requirement could be met unilaterally (e.g., opinion polls, statements of
religious leaders) and need not be endorsed by any multilateral institution.' 33
Finally, Marwell proposes that the exception should be expanded beyond
Type I restrictions to cover Type II restrictions. 134 1 label Marwell's vision as
a type of "expansive unilateralism with evidentiary constraints."
Marwell's proposal is attractive to several constituencies. First,
Marwell's proposal appeals to those who are concerned that the approach for
interpreting the public morals clause should not deviate from that used for
other GATTiWTO enumerated clauses. Marwell incorporates two well-
established concepts-the least-restrictive means test and the
nondiscrimination test-that are used in other parts of WTO law. Second,
Marwell's proposal, in allowing for Type II restrictions, also accommodates
those who seek a broader reading of the public morals clause to cover areas
such as human rights, labor rights, women's rights, and the like. Market
access can therefore serve as a tool to be leveraged to induce norms-altering
behavior in trading partners.
However, Marwell's proposal falls short when one considers whether its
adoption would enhance or undermine the global trade regime. Marwell
himself recognizes that a potential danger is his proposal's "overbreadth.' 35
In other words, by allowing countries to define morals unilaterally, his
proposal increases the possibility that some countries may advance their own
political or protectionist agenda in the name of safeguarding morals. This in
turn would "destabilize the reciprocal bargains that underlie the international
economic system and reduce net welfare by suppressing otherwise beneficial
economic exchange."'136 Marwell attempts to guard against this possibility by
131. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
132. Marwell, supra note 4, at 826.
133. Id. at 824-25.
134. Marwell suggests that the concept of public morals "could as easily be read to mean
'nation' or 'community' as 'international community."' See id. at 824. He only endorses examples of
Type II restrictions and does not explicitly discuss Type Ill restrictions. See, e.g., id. at 832 (child labor
example). However, one could postulate that most Type II restrictions would not meet his least-
restrictive means test.
135. Id. at 826.
136. Id.
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introducing the evidentiary constraints outlined above, but unfortunately,
these safeguards would ultimately not prove effective.
Consider, for example, this hypothetical: Select Arab countries enact a
labeling requirement that any company with a connection to the multinational
forces in Iraq must attach a prominent sticker stating that "this product is
made by a company that supports the Iraqi occupation." This requirement
would affect not only companies that supply military equipment but also
providers of software, vehicles, food, and services. In other words, it would
affect a vast number of prominent multinational corporations. Because it is a
labeling requirement and not a ban, it would pass Marwell's least-restrictive
means test. And because it is applied to goods from all countries, rather than
just those from the United States, it would also pass the nondiscrimination
test. Moreover, the evidentiary requirements could be easily met. Opinion
polls would likely show strong public support for such measures. Religious
leaders could testify that the continued marketing of goods produced by those
who support the "illegal occupation of fellow Muslims" runs counter to
established mores. But authorizing such forms of sanction would certainly
lead to a backlash against the WTO within the United States and other
countries targeted by similar sanctions.
The same analogy could be carried over to a number of different
contexts. For example, China could enact restrictions on companies that sell
military weapons to Taiwan, which it regards as a renegade province, because
they undermine the "moral of public order" by fostering a secessionist
movement. Or countries could place restrictions on companies that assist the
Israeli presence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The problem is that even
with Marwell's safeguard constraints, there is a distinct possibility that free
trade principles will be undermined by geopolitical interests disguised as
"public morals." A unilateral system, even one with constraints, would still
allow countries to enact restrictions under the rubric of public morality, even
as their underlying motive remains political. Over time, those countries hurt
by this process-the United States, European Union, and other industrialized
nations-would withdraw their support for this increasingly politicized global
regime.137 The strength of the WTO system might slowly come undone as it is
inundated with tit-for-tat, geopolitically motivated sanctions.
One might counter that the answer to this problem would simply be to
tighten the constraints further. But it is hard to envision what additional
constraints would solve the problem. One possibility is requiring procedural
constraints. Instead of simply demonstrating proof of support from opinion
polls or statements from religious leaders, a country must also pass the
restriction through its legislature after holding open hearings. Because of the
procedural costs involved, this would limit the frequency of such restrictions.
This solution might help, but it still would not solve the problem. All of the
hypothetical examples discussed above could easily pass through a required
137. This has been the case with several other multinational regimes where the organization's
effectiveness has been crippled after it became increasingly politicized, for example UNICEF after the
withdrawal of U.S. support and the U.N. Human Rights Council.
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legislative enactment process, if necessary. 138 Marwell's vision of
"unilateralism with constraints," if enacted, could gradually destabilize and
politicize the international trade regime.
3. Transnationalism
An alternative fix would be to shift away from the unilateralist approach
endorsed by Marwell toward a more transnationalist approach. Again, like
Marwell's proposal, this approach would interpret the public morals exception
dynamically and authorize its use beyond Type I restrictions. However, it
would differ in two respects. First, it would be grounded in a vision that
certain moral norms are shared universally, rather than crafted unilaterally
within national borders. Second, it would impose different evidentiary
requirements. A country could not prove that a public moral existed simply by
turning to internal domestic evidence. Instead, countries would be required to
show that the public moral is shared widely by a group of similarly situated
countries. As justification, countries could point to international agreements
that endorse the moral principle, or to national restrictions in other similar
countries, or even to rulings by transnational bodies such as the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) or the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Adopting a transnationalist approach would again meet the objectives of
individuals who seek a means of allowing outward-directed restrictions on
moral grounds. Furthermore, this approach would ground the moral principle
in other sources of international law. This practice is already embraced by
WTO adjudicators when interpreting other enumerated clauses in the
GATT/WTO text. 139 Therefore, this approach also avoids conflict with other
WTO interpretative approaches.
At first glance, this approach seems quite attractive. It permits countries
whose citizens feel strongly about human rights abuses or other violations of
international law to enact trade restrictions against regimes responsible for
such abuses. The legitimacy for such action is grounded not only in the
WTO's public morals clause but in other treaties or customary practices
widely endorsed by the international community. This approach would
thereby link bodies of international law closer together and foster
transnational norm-building. Unlike Marwell's approach, it would also
constrain the ability of WTO members to exercise the morality exception
unilaterally. A state would need to justify its trade restriction based on shared,
transnational principles. For example, this approach would authorize trade
sanctions against Burma, but not China's censorship of internet services.
138. For example, China's legislature, the National People's Congress, has made its position
quite clear that it will not tolerate anyone who supports Taiwanese independence. See Top Legislature
Adopts Anti-Secession Law, CHINA.ORG (Mar. 14, 2005), available at
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005/Mar/122756.htm. Similarly, it would not prove difficult to obtain
legislative authorization condemning the American presence in Iraq or the Israeli presence in the
Palestinian Territories.
139. See, e.g., Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and
Marketing of Biotech Products, 7.72, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006).
The panel report turns to the Vienna Convention, Rio Declaration, and Cartagena Protocol in
interpreting legal issues concerning the WTO's Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement.
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Unfortunately, a transnationalist approach also cannot successfully avoid
the problems faced by Marwell's expansive unilateralist approach. While the
optimistic vision of a vitalized transnational norm-building project could
certainly occur, a darker outcome is also possible. Under the transnationalist
approach, geopolitical issues could still be introduced under the guise of
"public morals" to the detriment of the WTO regime. For example, both the
hypothetical restriction against suppliers to Taiwan and Israel would pass an
evidentiary test requiring transnational legitimacy. There is clear universal
recognition of Taiwan as formally a part of China; no government or
international organization recognizes Taiwan as an independent state. 140
Similarly, there is near-universal recognition that the West Bank and Gaza
Strip do not belong to Israel, including a U.N. Security Resolution to that
effect. 141 Simply requiring international recognition to legitimate an action
therefore does not solve the problem.
Moreover, there is the added risk that such an approach would allow
countries to use the guise of public morals to advance not only geopolitical
agendas, but also protectionist ones. The public morals clause could become a
cover for disguised trade barriers. Consider, for example, if the European
Commission wanted to enact a Type III restriction against all countries that
condone the death penalty. Again, it could legitimate its action on the basis of
domestic and international support; the European public is strongl anti-death
42 g 3penalty,' and capital punishment is widely banned worldwide. But then
consider which countries' products would be adversely affected by this
restriction. The list includes the United States, Japan, and China-all key
competitors of European producers. And then one might wonder: is this truly
a public moral being enforced or might this be a disguised protectionist tactic
benefiting European producers at the expense of their competitors? The
answer may remain unclear. But from a legal realist standpoint, it is the
possibility of this negative outcome that matters. Any doctrinal approach that
140. A small number of governments do recognize Taiwan's government as the legitimate
government of China, but even these still recognize Taiwan as part of the territory of China. See
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China, Embassies and Missions Abroad,
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/ (follow "About MOFA" hyperlink; then follow "Embassies and Missions
Abroad" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 7, 2007). Also, in a number of international organizations,
including the WTO, Taiwan is given a special status (e.g., as a Customs Union), but is still considered to
be part of China, rather than an independent state. See, e.g., Pasha L. Hsieh, Facing China: Taiwan's
Status as a Separate Customs Territory in the World Trade Organization, 39 J. WORLD TRADE 1195
(2005).
141. See S.C. Res. 446, U.N. Doc. S/RES/446 (Mar. 22, 1979).
142. See Council of Europe, Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty in All
Circumstances, opened for signature Mar. 5, 2002, Europ. T.S. No. 187. The Protocol has been ratified
by almost all the members of the European Community and entered into force on Jan. 7, 2003. For a list
of signatories, see Council of Europe, [Signatories to the] Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty
in All Circumstances, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/v3MenuTraites.asp (follow "you know the
CETS number of the abridged title of the treaty" hyperlink; then select "abolition of death penalty in all
circumstances" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 7, 2007).
143. At least 118 nations have already banned capital punishment, either in law or in practice.
See Bree Polk-Bauman, Capital Punishment: Where the World Stands, U.N. CHRON. ONLINE, 2004,
http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2004/issue4/0404p29.html.
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might adversely affect three of the world's four largest exporters is not likely
to win acceptance.
144
B. A Proposed Solution
How then are we to solve this conundrum? One possibility is to accept
the implication of U.S.-Gambling, that only Type I restrictions are permitted
under the public morals exception. If countries seek to expand the scope of
public morals to incorporate human rights, women's rights, or labor rights,
they should do so through textual additions to GATT Article XX. Debra
Steger has called for a wholesale revision of the general exceptions, including
clarification of the public morals clause to reflect widely accepted
international conventions on human rights and labor rights. 145 Others echo
Steger's idea that the addition of new exceptions to the text itself is the best
way for the WTO to address social issues. 146 Jose Alvarez has argued that,
before the WTO tries to tackle issues such as human rights, its members must
first build a political consensus through negotiations at both international and
national levels. 14 7 Similarly, Andrew Guzman has suggested that labor rights
are "a political issue that should be addressed through a political process."1
48
This approach is attractive because it is clean and straightforward.
However, as noted above, even if one were to restrict the public morals
exception to simply Type I (i.e., inward-oriented) restrictions, some doctrinal
clarifications may be necessary. In addition, given the time and difficulties
required to pass such textual amendments, the practical impact of any major
change might not be felt for decades, if ever. Developing countries will most
likely resist efforts to introduce new textual amendments, as evidenced by
their fierce opposition in the Singapore Ministerial Conference to discussion
of the social clause.
This last Section takes a two-part approach. First, it proposes additional
clarifications that should be made by the WTO in its interpretation of the
public morals clause, even if the exception's scope is restricted simply to
Type I, inward-oriented measures. Second, it proposes the imposition of an
144. Even without these hypothetical public morals cases in place, there is already pressure
within the United States to withdraw from the WTO because of negative rulings against it on steel and
agricultural tariffs. See, e.g., Press Release, Congressman Pete Visclosky, Visclosky to Call for U.S.
Withdrawal from the WTO (June 8, 2005), available at http://www.house.gov/visclosky/
archive/WTOWithdrawal.html.
145. Debra P. Steger, Afterword, The "Trade and..." Conundrum-A Commentary, 96 AM. J.
INT'L L. 135, 144 (2002) (noting that while Steger thinks that the scope of the WTO Agreement should
be left as is, she does "believe that the linkage between the norms already set out in the GATT, which
have been listed in Article XX since 1948, could be clarified and modified to better reflect present-day
shared values and norms").
146. See, e.g., Patricia Stirling, The Use of Trade Sanctions as an Enforcement Mechanism for
Basic Human Rights: A Proposal for Addition to the World Trade Organization, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 1 (1996); Gonzalez, supra note 128, at 971-72.
147. Jose E. Alvarez, How Not to Link: Institutional Conundrums of an Expanded Trade
Regime, 7 WIDENER L. Symp. J. 1, 19 (2001).
148. Andrew T. Guzman, Trade, Labor, Legitimacy, 91 CAL. L. REv. 885, 891 (2003)
(suggesting, as well, the creation of a separate labor department within the WTO); accord Chantal
Thomas, Should the World Trade Organization Incorporate Labor and Environmental Standards?, 61
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 347, 373-74 (2004) ("Labor and environmental standards might be better
incorporated through legislation rather than adjudication.").
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additional set of requirements should the WTO decide in the future to extend
the scope of the exception to Type II and possibly also Type III measures that
are outward-oriented. To be clear, this Note does not explicitly call for such
an extension. Indeed, as will be discussed, several individuals have outlined
valid reasons why such a move should be avoided. 149 But if such a move were
made, this Note advocates a bifurcated approach in which adjudicators
examine inward- and outward-directed measures differently, with the latter
subject to more stringent analysis.
1. Requirements for Type I (i.e., Inward-Directed) Measures
As discussed earlier, the WTO has only explicitly recognized that the
public morals exception may exempt certain Type I restrictions directed at
protecting the morals of domestic citizens. Even in such instances,
unanswered questions remain, such as who defines public morals and whether
the measure must meet certain legitimacy requirements in order to qualify as a
legitimate public moral. For such restrictions, I propose that WTO
adjudicatory bodies apply a four-part test.
First, the adjudicators must determine whether the measure falls under
the public morals exception. The U.S.-Gambling language of "standards of
right and wrong" offers little concrete guidance as to what measures fall
within the scope of the exception. I propose instead that adjudicators
undertake a two-step analysis in determining this first question. First, they
should consider whether the measure at stake concerns a classification of
morals as originally understood by the GATT's drafters. In U.S.-Gambling,
the challenged measure would have qualified under this step of the analysis.
However, since U.S.-Gambling recognized a dynamic interpretation of the
exception, a second step to the analysis should be added. If a measure fails to
qualify pursuant to one of the original categories, the adjudicators then should
consider whether it falls within a jus cogens norm, or alternatively, a category
that is widely recognized as a moral issue. For the latter, countries need not
agree on the specifics of the norm itself, just that the category as a whole
constitutes a moral issue. For example, states may differ about the specific
religious restrictions to be imposed on imports of food and beverages, but
most would recognize that the category writ large qualifies as an issue of
public morality.
Provided the challenged measure could fall under the public moral
exception, the adjudicatory body would then proceed with the second and
third parts of the test. These are the standard necessity and nondiscrimination
tests, as applied to Article XX's general exceptions and incorporated into the
public morals clause analysis by U.S.-Gambling.
Finally, I propose adding a fourth step as a means of testing whether a
public moral is prevailing, as a guard, albeit an imperfect one, against
disguised protectionism. I suggest that only measures which are, in effect,
statutes passed through a legislative process, be allowed to qualify under the
public morals exception. This requirement prevents a strongman from single-
149. See infra notes 153-156 and accompanying text.
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handedly imposing restrictions under the guise of morality through an
executive order, decree, or administrative regulation. Instead, it ensures a
certain degree of debate about the need for a morality-based restriction.
Moreover, it promotes transparency in the form of a legislative record that
adjudicators can scrutinize when examining the motive for the restriction. Of
course, I acknowledge that such ideals may be compromised in states with
controlled quasi-legislatures, but even in such states, this proposed limitation
creates additional cost for enacting morality-based restrictions that will
hopefully deter some (though, unfortunately, not all) disguised protectionist
measures.
My proposed approach differs from originalism in that it allows the
categories of public morals to evolve dynamically. Thus, this approach is
more in keeping with the Panel's statement in U.S.-Gambling that the content
of public morals can vary with time and space.1 50 At the same time, it differs
from Marwell's proposal in that it imposes a quasi-universalist requirement,
rather than allowing countries to define morals unilaterally. It also differs
from a transnationalist approach insofar as there need not be widespread
agreement on the particular moral issue, but only near-consensus that the
category to which the issue belongs falls under the auspices of public
morality.
As a result, this proposal significantly lessens the potential risk that the
public morals exception could be hijacked by geopolitical or protectionist
interests, at least insofar as Type I restrictions are concerned. The hypothetical
restrictions placed on supporters of Israel, Taiwan, or the U.S. presence in Iraq
considered earlier above 51 would all fail the first part of my proposed test
because there is no agreement that the category under which they fall (e.g.,
anti-occupation or anti-secession sentiments) is one that implicates public
morality.
Such an approach offers the possibility that the scope of public morals
can evolve dynamically to accommodate the changing global context. It also
eliminates the risk of becoming overly broad, since the scope can only expand
once there is near-universal agreement that a category falls under the morals
exception. Finally, by imposing a requirement for a legislative record, the test
ensures that some modicum of debate occurs before a restriction is enacted
and creates an evidentiary record for adjudicators to review in any potential
litigation.
2. Requirements for Type II and Type III (i.e., Outward-
Directed) Measures
Whether the public morals exception extends to extraterritorial
applications is an unresolved matter that has triggered tremendous debate.
While a number of academics have advocated for such an interpretation,'
52
others have argued vociferously against it. Jagdish Bhagwati has suggested
that the WTO is unqualified to "manage the complex issues" that would arise
150. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
151. See supra Subsection IV.A.2.
152. See supra Section II.C.
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if trading privileges were linked to labor rights and the like.153 Such sanctions
are often counterproductive and function as the "GATT-sanctions version of
gunboat diplomacy," placing weaker countries at a disadvantage.' 154 Others
have suggested that it is practically impossible for Article XX(a) to permit
WTO members to apply its concept of public morals extraterritorially, since
"[t]he notion of public morals is very variable in different States and the
application of such a subjective concept with extraterritorial effects could put
the whole system of reciprocal commercial advantages guaranteed by the
GATT at grave risk."'
155
This Note has argued that the WTO should proceed with caution; it does
not directly advocate interpreting the public morals exception to apply to
outward-directed measures. This is a decision that a future Appellate Body
will need to make, weighing the clear risks and benefits of such an
interpretation. 156 What this Note does suggest is that, were the Appellate Body
to do so, it has two options: it can limit the exception's application to Type II
restrictions only or recognize its application to Type III restrictions as well.
Regardless of which move the Appellate Body chooses to make, this Note
proposes that it impose three additional requirements on the party enacting the
challenged measure, on top of the four-part test discussed above.
First, the member enacting the trade-restrictive measure in the interest of
public morality must provide direct proof that its public cares strongly about
the moral issues at hand. Simple enactment through a legislative process is
insufficient; the enacting government must also show, through opinion polls
or a direct referendum, that a significant percentage of its citizens hold such
moral views. This requirement ensures that governments and legislatures
cannot enact Type II and III restrictions that serve only the interests of their
party constituents or special interests but must instead show that these moral
interests are widely shared. 
157
Second, the moral norm at stake must itself have been codified by an
international organization through a treaty, guideline, code, or other document
that has been explicitly endorsed by a majority of WTO members. Examples
that would qualify include the International Labour Organization's guidelines
153. Jagdish Bhagwati, Afterword, The Question of Linkage, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 126, 132
(2002).
154. Id. at 133.
155. Diego J. Liftin Nogueras & Luis M. Hinojosa Martinez, Human Rights Conditionality in
the External Trade of the European Union: Legal and Legitimacy Problems, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 307,
328 (2001); cf Claire R. Kelly, Enmeshment as a Theory of Compliance, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
303, 328 (2005) (arguing that Type II restrictions do not "fall under the WTO's Article XX
exceptions"); Dexter Samida, Protecting the Innocent or Protecting Special Interests? Child Labor,
Globalization, and the WTO, 33 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 411, 426 n.108 (2005) (suggesting the
improbability of success for an extraterritonal application of Article XX(a) in the form of a child labor
ban).
156. Such a decision could also be resolved through political negotiations. See supra notes 147-
148.
157. One could argue that this requirement should also apply to Type I restrictions. I am open
to this possibility, but did not suggest it because there is an added cost involved for governments, and
also because citizens are more likely to participate in a legislative process where those impacted are
themselves, rather than foreigners in another state.
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on child labor 58 and the U.N. Convention on Genocide. 159 Imposing such a
requirement ensures that outward-directed measures are taken only on the
basis of norms embraced by the international community. Trade sanctions
could not be taken for norms that are still evolving or for which widespread
disagreement persists.
Finally, a country must demonstrate that any outward-oriented
restriction is directed against countries that have already explicitly embraced
this norm. Put differently, restrictions cannot be imposed against a country
for violating a norm that it has never endorsed. While controversial, this
requirement is absolutely critical if the problems faced by the other alternative
proposals are to be avoided. It ensures that a broader interpretation of the
public morals exception does not cause the WTO regime to degenerate into a
mechanism whereby countries seek to impose their moral norms on one
another. Countries would only be held accountable for those norms to which
they have already acceded.
Such a requirement implicitly recognizes the primacy of states in
recognizing and realizing international human rights, labor rights, and other
accepted transnational norms. It suggests, however, that if a state recognizes,
but fails to realize, a norm-because of either incapacity or unwillingness-
that other states have the legal right to apply pressure to ensure the norm's
realization.
Bagwell, Mavroidis, and Staiger have advanced an argument for why
this is normatively fair. 161 Ratification of treaty commitments creates
reasonable expectations for trading partners that a country will abide by such
commitments. These expectations can factor into the trading partners'
negotiations of market access and other concessions with that country. To the
extent that a country fails to comply with the obligations of a ratified treaty,
this may have market access implications, and therefore, in principle, its
trading partners should have a right of redress.
The burden of proof for demonstrating a state's noncompliance with a
ratified treaty norm should fall on the enacting party. If the treaty in which the
moral obligation arises has an enforcement body, then the enacting party
should offer a determination from that body as proof of the noncompliance
that justified its morality-based trade restriction. If the treaty lacks an
associated enforcement body, then the WTO should not delve into the task of
interpreting treaties arising under other international law regimes, as it lacks
the capacity to do so properly. Instead, the WTO might apply a clear
statement rule, requiring the enacting party to demonstrate a violation of a
158. See Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of
the Worst Forms of Child Labour, June 17, 1999, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161; see also ILO Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, art. 2, June 18, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1233, 1237-38.
159. Genocide Convention, supra note 105.
160. This is a slight narrowing of Sarah Cleveland's previous suggestion that, because the
concept of public morals is quite broad, the "Article XX provisions necessarily must be limited to values
which are either mutually binding on the sanctioning and target states by treaty, or which are core jus
cogens and erga omnes obligations of the international community." Sarah H. Cleveland, Human Rights
Sanctions and the World Trade Organization, in ENVIRONMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE, supra note 126, at 199, 239.
161. Kyle Bagwell, Petros C. Mavroidis & Robert W. Staiger, It's a Question of Market
Access, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 56, 73-74 (2002).
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clear treaty obligation. Any ambiguity would be resolved in favor of the
challenging party rather than examined in-depth by the WTO.
Returning to our earlier hypothetical,162 Article XX(a) could therefore
not be used to place restrictions against the United States, China, and Japan
for their use of the death penalty because none of these countries have
explicitly pledged to ban capital punishment. Certainly, such a constraint
would reduce the effectiveness of Type II and III restrictions in advancing
human rights or labor rights causes, but it would not altogether eliminate it.
Moreover, from a realist standpoint, such a constraint may be necessary if a
more expansive reading of the public morals clause is to be endorsed by the
major trading powers.
Skeptics of my proposal are likely to ask whether adding a qualifier that
a country has already ratified a treaty obligation causes the morality-based
restriction to be devoid of consequence. After all, what good is a threat
directed at those who have already pledged not to violate a norm? I recognize
that if outward-directed restrictions cannot be directed at pariah states, they do
lose much of their bite. Nevertheless, they are not entirely without effect. For
example, my proposal would allow countries to place restrictions on trade
with violators of the U.N. Genocide Convention, such as Serbia, a signatory
found to be in violation of the Convention by the International Court of
Justice. 163
In addition, the proposal directly affects any country that signed onto an
international convention without intending to comply fully. 164 Such countries
would now either have to comply fully or take the embarrassing measure of
withdrawing from the convention and exposing their empty promise to their
domestic constituents. Plenty of countries would be affected. For example,
Saudi Arabia and others would face a hard choice about whether they should
comply or withdraw from the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women. 165 Vietnam and many African dictatorships
would be forced to confront whether they should comply with granting
freedom of expression and assembly as they have promised under the U.N.
Convention on Civil and Political Rights, or withdraw.'6 6 Hopefully, these
increased costs of noncompliance would spur countries to grant rights long
promised but never delivered. In the very least, this proposal would cull the
162. See supra Subsection IV.A.2.
163. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo. (Serb. & Mont.)), 2007 I.C.J. (Feb. 26) (finding Serbia to have
violated the obligation to prevent genocide under the Convention, with respect to the Srebrenica
genocide in July 1995).
164. This is a fairly common phenomenon, given that many countries view such conventions as
lacking in enforcement mechanisms and consequences for non-compliance. See, e.g., Ryan Goodman &
Derek Jinks, International Law and State Socialization: Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative
Challenges, 54 DuKE L.J. 983 (2005); Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?
Ill YALE L.J. 1935 (2002).
165. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
166. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, art. 2(1), U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200 (Dec. 16, 1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar.
23, 1976).
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list of signatories of international conventions to those who actually comply
while exposing those signatories that had no intention of ever doing so.1
7
I recognize that my proposal is a second-best solution and may prove
disappointing to many transnational activists who advocate a more forceful
interpretation of the public morals exception. Nevertheless, I argue that it is
the best that we can hope for given present circumstances. Textual
amendments may be preferable, but are unlikely to occur any time soon.
Meanwhile, a more expansive unilateralist or transnationalist interpretation
has its own problems. Doctrinal shifts to accommodate human rights and labor
rights interests may also result in accommodating other, less desirable
protectionist or geopolitical interests as well. If such doctrinal shifts are not
managed carefully, the ultimate result from an otherwise noble goal may be
the weakening of the legitimacy of the entire WTO system.
We should therefore be careful when advocating any doctrinal shift that
permits WTO members to become overly aggressive in enacting public morals
restrictions, especially when these restrictions affect not only their own
citizens but those in other member states as well. This Note has argued that
any proposal to expand the public morals doctrine needs to be moderate and
contain stronger limiting constraints than others have proposed to date. Only
then can we balance an interest in expanding the scope of the public morals
exception beyond U.S.-Gambling with maintaining a robust free trade regime.
V. CONCLUSION
The public morals exception to free trade was arguably important
enough that the original drafters of the world trade "constitution" listed it as
the first of several exceptions to the principles of providing unfettered access
to trade privileges. 168 But for fifty-seven years, the exception remained
dormant-utilized but never formally explicated. Only recently did the
doctrine reemerge, in the U.S.-Gambling decision, finalized in April 2005.
The birth of a newly emerging public morals exception clause doctrine has
generated excitement that the WTO may finally give greater consideration
within its jurisprudence to morality-related issues, such as human rights.
While the emergence of a public morals clause doctrine is welcome, this
Note has suggested, first, that we should not become overly optimistic about
what it can deliver in terms of human rights and labor rights, and second, that
we should be cautious in how we go about shaping its evolution. This is
because the doctrine, as laid out in U.S.-Gambling, is nascent. U.S.-Gambling
clarified only the basics of the public morals clause doctrine in a manner
consistent with the core principles of international trade law. As a result, a
number of important questions remain unanswered, as outlined in Part III.
167. This proposal might also have a chilling effect on the drafting of additional multilateral
treaties and create additional incentives for countries not to sign agreements in the first place. Whether
one views these effects as positive or negative depends on one's normative views about the impact of
countries ratifying treaties to which they have no intention to comply.
168. See John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV.
L. REv. 511 (2000) (suggesting that the GATT and WTO founding documents serve as a world trade
constitution).
Free Trade and the Protection of Public Morals
Several possibilities exist as to how the public morals doctrine can
evolve as these questions are answered. To many, by far the most attractive
possibilities to activists are expansive approaches that emphasize the
unilateral right of countries to delineate their own morals and/or the
importance of transnational norms. This Note suggests that while these are
noble approaches, they entail inherent dangers. Such doctrinal evolutions, if
not implemented carefully, may ultimately lead to unintended consequences
that threaten the stability and legitimacy of the WTO regime. Yet at the same
time, to wait for textual amendments to the GATT/WTO legal documents that
would affirmatively enumerate members' rights to exercise restrictions based
on concerns of human rights or labor standards is to wait largely in vain. Calls
for such additions to date have been ignored or met with skepticism.
If we are to move beyond U.S.-Gambling to affirmatively recognize a
right to exercise a public morals exception for human rights, labor standards,
and other rights, we must do so through judicial interpretation in a careful,
limited manner. This Note has suggested a bifurcated approach, in which
countries are given greater leeway to enact restrictions that protect their own
citizens, but must concurrently meet more stringent requirements if they seek
to impose restrictions that affect citizens in other WTO member states. This
proposed approach recognizes the right of countries to shape their own norms
rather than have them imposed through trade leverage, but at the same time
demands that those that make normative commitments actually follow them.
Some might contend that such a proposal for future doctrinal evolution
does not go far enough. But it is certainly an improvement over the dormancy
of the doctrine that persisted for nearly six decades and the largely ambiguous
state of affairs that still persists after U.S.-Gambling. And, after all, better that
we progress too slowly and not tap the full potential of this newly emerging
doctrine than to move too fast in the wrong direction and unintentionally
weaken the entire system.
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ANNEX I
WTO MEMBERS ASSERTING MORALITY-BASED TRADE RESTRICTIONS
AS NOTED BY THE WTO SECRETARIAT IN TRADE POLICY REVIEWS*
WTO Member Products Prohibited or Restricted Due to Public Document SymbolMorality Reasons*
WT/TPR/S/185/Rev. 1 (Oct.Bahrain Live swine; drugs 23, 2007) at 28-29
Swine products, drugs; obscene or subversive
materials or those containing matters likely to WT/TPR/S/168/Rev 1 (Nov.Bangladesh offend religious feelings and beliefs of citizens of 15, 2006) at 55, 142
Bangladesh
WT/TPR/S/131 (May 24,
Benin Narcotics 2004) at 42 n.68
Brunei Alcohol; gambling-related products, opium; WT/TPR/S/84 (Apr 27, 2001)
certain meat products at 43-45
Materials found to be obscene, treasonous,
Canada seditious, hate propaganda, or child pornography; WT/TPR/S/53 (Nov. 19, 1998)posters depicting crime & violence; coin at 46
counterfeits
Colombia Pornographic matenal involving minors; warlike WT/TPR/S/172/Rev. I (Apr. 3,toys 2007) at 41
Fiji Games of chance; the book "Satanic Verses" WT/TPRIS/24 (Mar. 13, 1997)
at 24
Gambia Pornography; narcotic drugs; matter deemed WT/TPR/S/127 (Jan. 5, 2004)
seditious, scandalizing, or demoralizing at 31, 37
Indecent printed articles; certain cinematographic WT/TPR/S/l 22 (Oct. 1, 2003)Guyana films at 44
WT/TPR/S/99/Rev I (Oct. 7,
Haiti Pornography; narcotics; counterfeiting equipment 2003)at/4 (
WT/TPR/S/120 (Aug. 29,Honduras Drugs, narcotics, psychotropics, & pornography 2003) at 46
Indonesia Alcohol WT/TPR/S/184/Rev. 1 (Nov.
6, 2007) at 46
Licentious or indecent films; counterfeit currency; WT/TPR/S/157/Rev.1 (Mar.
Israel gambling or lottery tickets & games; blank sales 24, 2006) at 30
invoices; goods with false product descriptions
Jamaica Counterfeit goods; obscene or indecent printed WT/TPR/S/l 39/Rev. I (Mar. 9,matter, films & articles 2005) at 48
WT/TPR/S/1 37 (Aug. 18,Korea Pornography and other unacceptable materials 2004)at 54
Articles bearing imprint or reproduction of any
currency note; indecent or obscene articles; cloth WT/TPR/S/92 (Nov. 5, 2001)
Malaysia bearing the imprint or reproduction of any verses at 37-38 & n 27
of the Koran
Morocco Narcotics and psychotropic drugs, pornographic WT/TPR/S/I 16 (May 19,
matenals and pornographic art, bovine animals 2003) at 41
Mozambique Pomography; narcotic drugs WT/TPRJS/79 (Dec. 21, 2000)
at 33
WTITPRS/147 (Apr. 13,Nigeria Certain spirits; obscene articles 2005) at 36
Indecent or morally offensive printed publications; WT/TPR/S/186 (Aug 13,
Panama foreign lottery or raffle tickets; smoking opium & 2007) at 39
resin
WT/TPR/S/144 (Jan 24,Qatar Swine; pork & pork products; alcoholic beverages 2005) at 26-27
WT/TPR/S/155/Rev. 1 (Jan.Romania Drugs & narcotics 31, 2006) at 38
Book or pamphlet containing disparaging &
insulting religious references; indecent or obscene WT/TPR/S/128 (Feb. 4,2004)
Sn Lanka articles; lottery tickets, narcotic drugs; coins/notes at 38, 121-22
or imitation of coins/notes of any other
government
WT/TPR/S/135 (June 14,
Suriname Goods obtained illegally in their country of origin 2004) at 38-39
WT/TPR/S/165/Rev. 1 (OctTaiwan Dog meat 10, 2006) at 39
Tanzania Narcotic drugs WT/TPR/S/66 (Jan. 28, 2000)at 37
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Thailand Potassium permanganate; coin- or disc-operated WT/TPR/S/123 (Oct. 15,game machines 2003) at 45-46
WTITPR./S/I15I/Rev.l (Oct.
Trinidad & Tobago Indecent or obscene articles or matter 2005) atc4212, 2005) at 42
Meats of swine; oleaginous plants (cannabis, WT/TPR/S/152/Rev.1 (OctTunsia poppy); gums, resin and saps (opium, cannabis) 31, 2005) at 39-40
Gambling instruments, products making illegal use WT/TPR/S/125 (Nov. 19,Turkey of a trademark 2003) at 43-44
Narcotics, swine & its products; counterfeit
United Arab money; printed matter or works of art that WT/TPR/S/162/Rev.1 (June
Emirates contradict Islamic teachings, decency, or 28, 2006) at 26-28
deliberately imply irnmorality or turmoil
Zambia Indecent, obscene, or objectionable goods; pirated WT/TPR/S/106 (Sept. 25,
or counterfeit goods 2002) at 39
*Three different points should be noted about the countries listed and the products
identified in this Annex.
First, in several instances, a WTO member referenced public morality as one
among several reasons for restricting trade in its Trade Policy Review. It also listed
specific trade restrictions, but did not map products to specific exceptions. In such
instances, the Annex makes general inferences about common categories of products
excluded on moral grounds (e.g., pornography, narcotics, etc.). However, one should note
that for some products, multiple exceptions may apply. For example, narcotics may be
prohibited on the basis of public morals as well as on grounds of protecting human
health.
Second, several WTO members made reference to restricting trade based on
public morality in their Trade Policy Reviews but did not mention specific restrictions.
These include: Antigua, Australia, Barbados, Chile, India, Kenya, Liechtenstein,
Madagascar, Mexico, Niger, Paraguay, Switzerland, Uganda, the United States, and
Venezuela. These countries are not listed in the Annex above because of the missing
information about specific product restrictions, but should be considered as countries that
have exercised the public morals exception.
Finally, some countries referenced import prohibitions that appear to be based on
the public morals exception, but made no specific mention of morality. For example,
Namibia bans indecent or obscene goods, and Papua New Guinea bans pornography. I do
not include them in the Annex above, as I did not infer these countries to have exercised
the public morals exception However, it is quite possible that they have done so, but that
their exercise of the public morals exception was omitted in their Trade Policy Review.
Source: WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy Reviews of various countries, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tpr.e/tpre.htm.

